In many industrial systems, where safety is of the utmost importance, it is necessary that expedient tools for accident analysis are available and employed at the design stage. Such tools must be able to handle large systems in a systematic way and display the factors that are of vital importance for the functionality of the system. The technique of fault tree analysis (FTA) is commonly used to assess the failure probability of such systems. The fault tree represents the failure logic of the system in an inverted tree structure and has the advantage that it provides very good documentation of the way the failure logic was developed. Conventional fault tree quanti cation requires a number of assumptions regarding the system. One of these is that the basic events in the tree occur independently. This condition is not satis ed when sequential failures are encountered. Employing alternative methods, such as Markov methods, can result in the loss of the documentation that represents the failure logic of the system.
INTRODUCTION
When investigating potential accident sequences, the time between the occurrences of events can be an important parameter [1] . This type of system could be characterized as one with various shutdown mechanisms that are initiated given the presence of some initiating event, e.g. when a pressure limit is exceeded. In order to identify all relevant accidents for a such a system, Nielsen stated that the safety assessment tool used must be able to determine the possible causes of the accident event and identify the possible consequences given that one or more of the accident limiting provisions could fail.
The technique of fault tree analysis (FTA) [2] is commonly used to assess the probability of failure of industrial systems. This method represents the failure logic of the system in an inverted tree structure and provides very good documentation of the way that the system failure logic was developed. The FTA technique, however, is incapable of identifying both the possible causes of an undesirable event AND all the possible consequences resulting from it. In addition to this, the FTA method cannot accurately analyse systems containing sequential failures. Markov models [3] do not require the assumption of independence, as with the FTA method, and can therefore be used accurately to analyse sequential failures. This modelling technique describes the system in a state transition diagram. The state transition diagram is not as easy to construct as a fault tree and contains no textual description regarding the failure logic of the system. As with the FTA method, the Markov analysis method has the ability to identify the possible causes of the undesirable events yet is incapable of identifying all the possible consequences resulting from it.
A technique has been developed that possesses the ability to identify the causes of an undesired event and from this event develop all possible system consequences. The technique is known as the causeconsequence diagram method. The cause-consequence diagram method was developed at RISO National Laboratories, Denmark, in the 1970s, speci cally to aid in the reliability and risk analysis of nuclear power plants in Scandinavian countries [4] . The method was created to assist in the cause-consequence accident analysis of the nuclear plants, which involved identi cation of the potential modes of failure of individual components and then relating these causes to the ultimate consequences for the system [5] . The method can be seen as superior to event tree analysis (ETA) [4] , which is also capable of identifying all consequences of a given critical event, as it models at component level and therefore is functionality driven and not subsystem driven. In addition to this, the cause-consequence diagram method can account for time delays, which is not a feature available in the ETA method. Nielsen stated that, as well as being a tool for illustrating the consequences of particular failures, the method could also serve as a basis from which the probability of occurrence of the individual consequences could be evaluated. The consequences evaluated include those that illustrate the system functioning as intended and those that illustrate an undesirable failure sequence. Several authors have used the technique as the main analysis tool for a safety assessment [6] [7] [8] [9] . However, the documentation of the quanti cation of the cause-consequence diagram is limited and a generalized analysis method or even rigorous de nitions of the meaning of the symbols to enable quanti cation is yet to be developed. This is the subject considered in this paper. Rules for construction and quanti cation of the cause-consequence diagram have been developed and applied to an industrial system.
The quanti cation method developed can be automated for computerized system assessment and has the capability to deal with dependencies that can occur when analysing systems whose operation is sequential. These dependencies include component failures that are repeated as causes of more than one decision box event.
The occurrence of such a common event therefore in uences the outcome of more than one of the decision boxes in any path. A second class of dependent events encompasses those events whose failures are inconsistent, and the occurrence of a speci c component failure mode excludes the possibilities of other components failing, which feature in other parts of the diagram and are therefore mutually exclusive.
CAUSE-CONSEQUENCE DIAGRAM METHOD
The main principle of the cause-consequence diagram technique is based on the occurrence of a critical event, i.e. an event that disturbs the balance of the process plant. The identi cation of the critical event is problem dependent, and choosing the correct place to start is important as there are very many possible initial events, not all of which have serious consequences. Focus should therefore only be made on functional failures of process components that directly affect the plant balance. Once a critical event has been identi ed, all relevant causes of the critical event and potential consequences are developed using two conventional reliability analysis methods. This situation is represented in Fig. 1 . The two reliability analysis tools used in the development of the cause-consequence diagram method are the FTA method and the ETA method. The FTA method is used in two independent situations to describe the causes of an undesired event. Firstly, the technique is used to describe the causes of the critical event. The second function for the fault tree method is to describe the failure causes of the accident-limiting systems (emergency shutdown systems). The event tree method is used as the link between the causes of the critical event and the various consequences that could result. The method is used to identify the various paths that the system could take, following the critical event, depending on whether certain subsystems/components function correctly or not. The relationship between the two reliability methods is shown in Fig. 2 . Fig. 1 Simple representation of a cause-consequence diagram structure
SYMBOLS FOR CONSTRUCTION
The symbols used for the construction of a causeconsequence diagram are depicted in Table 1 . The overall structure of the cause-consequence diagram method is depicted in Fig. 3 .
RULES FOR CONSTRUCTION
Rules for the construction of a cause-consequence diagram can be detailed in two separate sections, those for the cause part of the diagram and those for the consequence part of the diagram. For the cause part it should be noted that the rules postulated are those used in the construction of a fault tree structure. The rules for the construction of the cause diagram can be summarized as a three-step procedure:
1. Similarly, a set of rules were devised for the construction of the consequence diagram:
1. Component ordering. The rst step of the causeconsequence diagram construction is deciding on the order in which component failure events are to be taken. To ensure a logical development of the causes of the system failure mode, it was decided that the ordering should follow the temporal action of the system, for example the system activation for the function required given an initial critical event. 2. Consequence diagram development. The second stage involves the actual construction of the diagram.
Starting from the initiating component, the functionality of each component or subsystem is investigated and the consequences of these sequences determined.
If the decision box is governed by a subsystem, then the probability of failure will be obtained via a fault tree diagram. 3. Reduction. If any decision boxes are deemed irrelevant, for example the boxes attached to the NO and YES branches are identical and their outcomes and consequences are the same, then these should be removed and the diagram reduced to a minimal form. Removal of these boxes will in no way affect the end result.
RULES FOR QUANTIFICATION
The procedure for analysing an independent system modelled using a cause-consequence diagram begins with the assignment of probabilities/frequencies to each outlet branch stemming from a decision box. Following this, the probability of any one sequence is obtained by multiplication of the probabilities associated with each decision box in that sequence [10] . The probability of any particular consequence is then obtained by the summation of the probability of each sequence that terminates in that consequence. This procedure, however, cannot be employed unless the failures of each decision box in a sequence are independent. Dependencies can exist in the cause-consequence diagram, and these must be dealt with prior to the quanti cation of the diagram.
Rules for dependent failure events

Common failure events
The rst dependency that can arise is that the same failure event exists in more than one fault tree structure on the same path in the cause-consequence diagram. In order to deal with a common failure event, the event is extracted from the fault tree structures and placed in a new decision box preceding the rst decision box that contains the common failure event. The original cause-consequence diagram is then duplicated on each outlet branch stemming from the new decision box. Following the NO outlet branch of the new decision box, the failure event is set to TRUE in any fault tree structure in which it is found. Similarly, following the YES outlet branch, the The decision box represents the functionality of a component/ system. The NO box represents failure to perform correctly, the probability of which is obtained via a fault tree or single component failure probability q i
Fault tree arrow represents the number of the fault tree structure that corresponds to the decision box
The initiator triangle represents the initiating event for a sequence where l indicates the rate of occurrence probability of failure of the common failure event is set to FALSE in any fault tree structure in which it is present. Fig. 4 can be utilized with the relevant fault trees depicted in Fig. 5 . In this example, the component K2 is required to perform two different functions; rstly to close-decision box 1, and then, later in the sequence, to open-decision box 3. In order to model this type of failure accurately, the cause-consequence diagram requires modi cation prior to quanti cation. Employing a basic event labelling convention in a fault tree structure can be used to identify an inconsistent failure event. If two labels are the same apart from the last character, then they are deemed as inconsistent failure events and the rst failure event represents the decision box containing the rst failure mode and the second failure event represents the decision box containing the second failure mode. This can be seen for the cause-consequence diagram in Fig. 4 , where Ft1 contains the basic event K2CO, the rst failure mode, and Ft3 contains the basic event K2CC, the second failure mode. Following the identi cation of an inconsistent failure event, the second failure mode is inspected and, depending on whether the second failure mode is an unrevealed or revealed failure event, the cause-consequence diagram is different. If the second failure mode is a revealed failure, then it cannot fail between operations and be undetected. Therefore, the time to failure of the second failure mode is set equal to the time it takes the system to travel from the rst failure event to the second failure event. If, on the other hand, the second failure mode is unrevealed, then it can occur between operations and be undetected. When this situation occurs, the second failure mode is extracted and placed in an existence decision box preceding the rst failure event. The causeconsequence diagram is then duplicated on both outlet branches and, following the YES outlet branch of the existence decision box, the decision box containing the rst failure mode is governed by the failure of the second failure mode. The second failure mode probability is set equal to 1 in all decision boxes beneath the existence decision box, and the rst failure mode is set equal to 0. Therefore, for Fig. 4 , assuming K2CC is an unrevealed failure event, the cause-consequence diagram illustrated in Fig. 6 would be created and reduced to the form shown in Fig. 7 .
Inconsistent failure events
Following the NO outlet branch of the existence decision box results in the same scenario as if the failure had in fact been a revealed failure. Therefore, the second failure event occurs in the time it takes the system to travel from the rst failure event to the second failure event.
Following the inspection of each sequence path in the cause-consequence diagram, and modi cation due to any identi ed dependent failure events, the cause-consequence diagram can be quanti ed by multiplying the probability associated with each decision box in each sequence. The probability of any consequence is then obtained via the summation of the probability of any sequence that terminates in that consequence.
PRESSURE TANK SYSTEM
The system used to illustrate the construction of a causeconsequence diagram is a pressure tank system that contains a start-up, shutdown sequence in addition to its operational phase [11] . The system con guration is given in Fig. 8 and the component individual functions and failure modes are represented in Table 2 .
Initially, the system is considered to be in a dormant state and therefore de-energized. Switch S1 and relay contacts K1 and K2 are all open when in the dormant state, and the timer and pressure switch contacts are closed. Depressing switch S1 provides power to the coil of K1 which results in the closure of the K1 contacts. Relay K1 self-latches when S1 opens when released, and power is also supplied to K2, resulting in K2 contacts closing, which starts the pump motor. It is assumed that the tank takes 30 min to ll, and once the pressure threshold is reached the pressure switch contacts open, de-energizing K2, which results in the removal of power from the pump motor. After a period of time the tank becomes empty and the pressure switch closes, which energizes K2. The pump restarts and the lling process commences again. The tank is lled twice daily and the system is inspected at 6 monthly intervals for dormant failures.
In the event of the pressure switch failing to open, a safety feature is included in the form of the timer relay. Power is applied to the timer relay following the closure of the K1 contacts, which initiates a clock. If the clock registers 30 min of continuous pumping, then the timer relay contacts are opened which results in a break in the circuit to K1 and system shutdown.
The rules developed for the construction of a cause- Step 1. Component failure event ordering. The ordering of the components for the construction of the causeconsequence diagram is selected by considering the temporal patterns of the system. For the pressure tank system, switch S1 is depressed, followed by its opening. Relay K1 energizes and powers K2 which powers the pump. ing power from the pump. Where the timer is required to break the circuit containing K1, K1 contacts should de-energize, removing power from K2, which results in the removal of the power supply to the pump. The ordering was therefore chosen to be S1, K1, K2, pressure switch, timer relay, K1, K2
It can be seen that the components K1 and K2 both occur twice in the ordering sequence. This is the result of the system containing two different phases, and hence some components perform different actions in each different phase. The components K1 and K2 are both required to close in the start-up sequence and open in the shutdown sequence. Steps 2 and 3. Cause-consequence diagram construction and reduction. The cause-consequence diagram was constructed by considering the effect of each component in the chosen order on the system performance. In order to highlight relevant features, only one lling sequence is investigated, the cause-consequence diagram of which is given in Fig. 9 . The corresponding fault trees are illustrated in Fig. 10 .
SYSTEM QUANTIFICATION
Prior to multiplying the probabilities associated with each decision box in each sequence, the cause-consequence diagram was checked for any dependent failure events.
The following dependent failure events were identi ed* (Table 2 ) and is therefore extracted and placed in an existence decision box preceding decision box 1. The cause-consequence diagram is modi ed using the procedure detailed in Section 5. (Table 2 ) and is therefore extracted and placed in an existence decision box. The cause-consequence diagram is modi ed using the procedure detailed in Section 5.1.2.
Following the appropriate modi cation owing to the dependent failure events identi ed, the nal causeconsequence diagram was developed and is shown in Figs 11 and 12, with the corresponding fault trees given in Fig. 13 . The probability of the system entering an overpressurized state was obtained using the component failure data shown in Table 3 . The system functions twice daily and therefore the time between operations is 12 h. The probability of failure for revealed failures between operations was hence obtained using equation (1) with tˆ12 h. For unrevealed failures the probability of failure was obtained using y and t, given in Table 3 , and equation (2):
The probability of each fault tree was calculated using the inclusion-exclusion method (7), and the probability of overpressure was obtained by summing the probabilities of any sequence that terminated in the consequence 'O'. There existed 12 such paths, and the probability of overpressure was calculated to equal 1.12 £ 10
¡5
. In addition to obtaining the probability of overpressure, the probability of the tank being empty, a safe operation and a normal operation can also be calculated and shown to equal 
CONCLUSIONS
The main advantage of the FTA method is that the failure logic of a system is well documented on the fault tree structure. Conventional fault tree quanti cation, however, requires a number of assumptions, which renders the analysis of sequential or dependent systems inaccurate. For such systems, an accurate analysis can be obtained via a Markov model, but the state transition diagram used in the Markov analysis holds no textual description regarding the failure logic of the system. The cause-consequence diagram method enables sequential or dependent systems to be modelled accurately with the retention of the failure logic for the system. In addition to this, more than one consequence can be modelled at a time as the cause-consequence diagram documents all system outcomes from a given critical event. In order to extend the capabilities of the cause-consequence diagram method, a list of construction and quanti cation rules have been developed and illustrated using an example system. In particular, this paper provides more rigorous de nitions of the symbols used and the approach to be adopted to construct the cause-consequence diagram. A new symbol is introduced to distinguish between events that exist at a speci ed time and those that occur at that time. Once the cause-consequence diagram is constructed, its quantication can be complicated by dependencies between the events represented by the decision boxes. An approach to resolving this problem is given that can be automated within a computational analysis methodology. Dependencies attributed to either repeated events or inconsistent events can be accounted for in this way.
